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Rejecting the Intertwining Doctrine:
Favoring ADR While Hindering
Judicial Efficiency and Economy
Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, LLC. Apartments'
I. INTRODUCTION
Often the scope of arbitration clauses does not include all potential claims. 2
When the provision fails to provide for all disputes, courts may proceed in one of
two ways to resolve both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims: enforce the arbitra-
tion clause with respect to the arbitrable claims, or ignore the private contract and
litigate all issues at once. The Colorado Supreme Court, in Ingold v. AIMCO,
chose the former-rejecting the intertwining doctrine. In doing so, Colorado
aligned itself with the position that the United States Supreme Court embraced
over twenty years ago. This casenote will discuss whether the Colorado Supreme
Court acted prudently and wisely in rejecting the intertwining doctrine.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In July of 2001, Chris and Cindy Ingold ("Ingolds") agreed to a one-year
lease with Boulder Creek Apartments ("Boulder Creek") in Denver, Colorado.3
Included in the contract was an arbitration clause, which stated, "All disputes
between the parties concerning the provisions of this Lease shall be submitted to
arbitration .... '
When the Ingolds took possession of the apartment in August, the unit con-
tained a foul odor as a result of a ruptured sewer pipe underneath the building.5
Upon taking residence in September, the odor had subsided.6 Although the odor
persisted throughout the year,7 the Ingolds renewed the lease in August 2002 after
Boulder Creek assured them that the problem would be addressed.8
1. 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007).
2. See generally MARTIN DOMKE Er AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 15:6 (3d ed.
2007).
3. Ingold, 159 P.3d at 118. The court noted, "For purposes of this proceeding the factual allega-




7. The extent of the odor is unclear. Id. The court simply stated that the odor remained "either be-
cause the sewer pipe was inadequately repaired or because sewage from the initial rupture was not
removed from underneath the apartment building." Id.
8. Id. The lease renewal was for an additional year,+ and it can be inferred that the 2002 lease con-
tained the same arbitration clause as the original agreement. Id.
1
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The odor remained, and the Ingolds began to suffer health problems asso-
ciated with mold and bacteria.9 The Ingolds subsequently consulted a physician
and hired two experts. 10 Both experts concluded that the apartment contained
mold and bacteria.-1  Thereafter the Ingolds abandoned the Boulder Creek apart-
ment in November of 2002.12 The Ingolds did not remove their possessions and
refused to pay the November rent. 13  Upon learning of the Ingolds' actions,
Boulder Creek denied the existence of health problems and informed the Ingolds
that failure to pay their outstanding rent was a breach of the lease. 14 Moreover,
Boulder Creek demanded $6,095.55 as a termination fee and withheld the Ingolds'
security deposit.
15
In October of 2004, the Ingolds filed suit in Boulder County district court
against Boulder Creek, AIMCO/Bluffs, LLC Apartments and the apartment man-
ager, James Macias. 16 The claims included: "eight tort claims, a claim for viola-
tion of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act... and a claim for violation of the
Wrongful Withholding of Security Deposits Act .... , 17 The defendants moved
for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing that the arbitration
clause contained in the lease agreement prevented the courts from hearing the
Ingolds' claims.'8 The Ingolds responded that they were "fraudulently induced
unto entering the Lease based on the Defendants' representations that the apart-
ment was habitable."'19 Therefore, the arbitration clause would be void, and the
court could not enforce it. 20
The district court found that Boulder Creek did not commit fraud, that the ar-
bitration clause applied to all ten claims, and that all defendants were parties to the
lease. 21 Therefore, the court dismissed the Ingolds' complaint and ordered the
Ingolds to arbitrate their claims pursuant to the lease agreement. 22 The Ingolds
appealed. They argued that the court had jurisdiction because not all of their
claims were within the scope of the arbitration clause and that the arbitration
clause only applied to Boulder Creek the court had jurisdiction.23
Upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court sought to determine whether the
district court properly applied the arbitration clause.24 The parties did not dispute
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Ingolds hired a microbiologist who concluded that the unit contained mold and bacteria.
Id. The Ingolds informed Boulder Creek's manager, James Macias, of the findings. Id. Mr. Macias
inspected the crawl space and attic of the Ingolds' apartment and disagreed with the microbiologist.
Id. Thereafter the Ingolds hired a second expert. Id. An industrial hygienist examined the same area





16. Id. at 118-19.
17. Id.
18. Id at 119.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Ingolds and Boulder Creek were the only two parties to sign the lease agreement. See
id. at 118. Mr. Macias was the property manager and AIMCO/Bluff was the parent company. Id.
21. Id at 118.
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that the tort claims and the claim for violation of the Colorado Consumer Protec-
tion Act against AIMCO/Bluffs, LLC Apartments were arbitrable; however, the
Ingolds argued that the claim for violation of the Wrongful Withholding of Securi-
ty Deposits Act and the tort claims against the third parties were not arbitrable.
25
On May 29, 2007, the court abandoned Colorado precedent favoring the intertwin-
ing doctrine when it held that the arbitrable claims must be arbitrated pursuant to
contract even though the Ingolds' complaint also contained claims and parties not
subject to arbitration.26
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Over the past two decades, arbitration has become a more attractive and more
utilized alternative to litigation.27 Parties find that arbitration provides participants
with a "quick, efficient, and economical method of resolving disputes." 28 Arbitra-
tion reduces the burden on the parties and the court system by offering a process
other than judicial review. 29 However, in many circumstances "a dispute between
parties to an arbitration agreement concerns some issues that are arbitrable, and
some issues that are not arbitrable."30 With more parties seeking arbitration, the
courts must determine how they should handle the nonarbitrable claims arising out
of the same operative facts as the arbitrable claims.
31
A. The Development of the Intertwining Doctrine
In Wilko v. Swan,32 the U.S. Supreme Court questioned what a court should
do when arbitrable claims are joined with nonarbitrable claims or those not subject
to arbitration. 33 In deciding that "when it is impractical if not impossible to sepa-
25. Id.
26. Id. at 119, 125.
27. Anthony G. Buzbee, When Arbitrable Claims are Mixed with Nonarbitrable Ones: What's a
Court to do?, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 663,664 (1998).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 664-65.
30. Lee R. Russ, Manner of Proceeding When Not All Disputed Issues are Arbitrable, in 15 COUCH
ON INs. § 212:6 (2007).
31. Mary Elizabeth Bierman, Mixed Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims in Securities Litigation:
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 525, 527 (1985).
32. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). For a discussion of the Wilko case, see B. Judson Hennington, 1H, Unra-
velling the Intertwining Doctrine: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 37 ALA. L. REV. 457, 457-58,
463 (1986).
33. Eric B. Liebman & Burkeley N. Riggs, The State of the Intertwining Doctrine in Colorado, 36-
JAN COLO. LAW. 15, 16 (2007) (In reaching its decision, the Court sought "to balance the FAA's
policy emphasizing 'the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications of litigation'
with the 1933 Act's policy of protecting investors and forbidding a waiver of those rights."). In
Wilko, a customer sued his broker alleging misrepresentations and omissions in stock transactions
according to the Federal Securities Act of 1933. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. The defendant moved to
compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement between the two parties. Id. at 429.
The district court refused the motion and found that the arbitration agreement deprived the plaintiff of
statutory remedies. Id. at 429-30. Subsequent to a reversal by the appellate court, the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals. Id. at 430, 438. The Court decided in favor of the Federal Securities Act
because "the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding
invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act." Id. at 438.
No. 1]
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rate out non-arbitrable federal securities law claims from arbitrable contract
claims, a court should deny arbitration in order to preserve its exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the federal securities act claims," the intertwining doctrine was born.34
Succinctly defined, the intertwining doctrine permits the trial court to deny arbi-
tration as to the arbitrable claims and try all claims together when arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction and are factually and legally
intertwined.35
Subsequent to the Wilko decision in 1953, federal district courts inconsistent-
ly applied the intertwining doctrine and the appellate courts split on the doctrine's
application. 36 The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the intertwining
doctrine, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits rejected it.37 If a court ap-
plies the doctrine, the trial court proceeds with hearing all claims regardless of an
existing arbitration agreement. However, if a court rejects the doctrine, those
claims that fall under the scope of an arbitration agreement must be arbitrated, and
any other, nonarbitrable claims, must proceed through the court system.
38
B. The Intertwining Doctrine in Federal Court: Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd
After thirty years of inconsistent application, the United States Supreme
Court settled the doctrinal conflict in 1985. 9 In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd,n° the Court addressed the question "whether to compel arbitration of pen-
dent state-law claims when the federal court will in any event assert jurisdiction
over a federal-law claim .. ,41
In Byrd, a customer filed a complaint in federal district court against the de-
fendant broker-dealer claiming violations of federal and state securities laws after
the customer's securities portfolio declined by more than half its value over a span
of six months.42 The plaintiff "alleged that the broker traded without prior con-
sent, excessively traded, and misrepresented the account's status. ' 43 "The agree-
ment between the customer and broker contained an arbitration clause requiring
arbitration of disputes concerning the customer agreement." 44 The defendant,
therefore, "filed a motion to compel arbitration of the pendent state law claims"
and sought a stay of litigation with respect to the federal securities claims.45 Fol-
lowing a denial of the motion and affirmation of the ruling by the district and
circuit courts, respectively, the Supreme Court "held that the intertwining doctrine
34. Id.; Hennington, supra note 32, at 463.
35. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985).




40. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
41. Id at 216.
42. Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 16 (citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213).
43. Id (citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213).
44. Id. (citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213).
45. Id. (citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213).
[Vol. 2008
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does not apply to arbitration agreements governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act."
4 6
In its opinion, the Court outlined the competing interests and arguments both
favoring and rejecting the intertwining doctrine.47 The Court stated that district
courts should decline to compel arbitration for two reasons.4 8 First, the intertwin-
ing doctrine "preserve[s] . ..the court's exclusive jurisdiction over the federal
securities claim [and] arbitration of an 'intertwined' state claim might precede the
federal proceeding and the fact finding done by the arbitrator might thereby bind
the federal court through collateral estoppel.' 9 Second, a federal district court
"avoids bifurcated proceedings and perhaps redundant efforts to litigate the same
factual questions twice.
' 50
In contrast, the Court concluded that although there are strong reasons to
compel a single litigation encompassing all claims, the Arbitration Act requires
courts to compel arbitration of arbitrable claims, when one of the parties files a
motion to compel. 51 "[T]he Act, both through its plain meaning and the strong
federal policy it reflects, requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to
arbitrate, and 'not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency' for those
of Congress."
52
The plain language of the Arbitration Act provides that "written agreements
to arbitrate controversies arising out of an existing contract 'shall be valid, irre-
vocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.' 53 The language is clear and definite: "it man-
dates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues
as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Congress did not express-
ly or impliedly provide the courts with discretion.
54
Along with the unequivocal language of the Arbitration Act, the legislative
history substantiates that Congress intended to "ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate." 55 The Court, therefore, rejected the ar-
gument "that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expe-
ditious resolution of claims. 5 6
Prior to Byrd, the intertwining doctrine had established that "arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims must be heard together, provided that they arise out of the
same transaction and are so intertwined that hearing them separately would fru-
strate the purposes of the Arbitration Act and the federal securities laws." 57 Sub-
sequent to Byrd, federal courts enforced agreements to arbitrate even though both
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims existed. 58 Although there was conflict be-
46. Id. (citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216).
47. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216-18.




52. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Heinold Secs., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1981)).
53. Id at 218 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 219.
56. Id.
57. Hennington, supra note 32, at 466.
58. Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 16.
No. 1]
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tween the Arbitration Act's goal of contract enforcement and the judicial system's
desire for efficient and speedy dispute resolution, Congress favored enforcing
private agreements. 59 Since the federal legislature found protecting the contrac-
tual rights of the parties to be compelling, without countervailing legislation fa-
voring one proceeding, the courts adhered to Congressional mandate.' "The
potential for bifurcated proceedings" no longer superseded "the primary goal of
the [Arbitration] Act--the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. ' '61
C. The Intertwining Doctrine in Colorado: 1981-2007
Prior to Byrd, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the intertwining doc-
trine.62 In Sandefer v. District Court,63 a customer filed a writ of mandamus con-
tending that the trial court erred in ordering the customer to submit to arbitration
in a suit against her securities broker for breach of fiduciary duty, common law
fraud, and violation of the Colorado Securities Act.64 The plaintiff argued that
only the third claim should and could be arbitrated.65 Although inconsequential to
the case before it,66 the court considered whether the ruling of the trial court to
compel arbitration of all claims "was correct in view of the public policy favoring
arbitration, the allegations in the complaint, the time and expense of separate arbi-
tration and judicial proceedings, and the possibility of inconsistent decisions in
separate proceedings." 67 After a thorough analysis of the Wilko decision and sub-
sequent federal decisions, the court found in favor of the developing intertwining
doctrine.68 The Court explained:
If the claims are found to be inextricably intertwined, the court will deny
arbitration in order to avoid duplication of effort and the possibility of
ending the controversy in arbitration and losing the opportunity to try the
securities claim in accord with Wilko. . . . On the other hand, if the
claims are distinct, the court must sever the action and allow the nonsta-
tutory claims to go to arbitration because the findings of the arbitrator
will neither encroach upon nor duplicate the findings of the trial court.
This analysis results in maximizing judicial efficiency and resource allo-
cation while still fulfilling the policy dictates of the securities laws.69
59. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
60. IdM
61. Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 16 (citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221).
62. Sandefer v. Dist. Ct. 635 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1981) (partially overruled on other grounds).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 548.
65. Id. at 548-49.
66. The Colorado Supreme Court did not find that the lower court had examined the arbitration
clause with respect to the other claims. The court explained, "The court of appeals only considered the
application and effect of the Colorado Securities Act, and there was no discussion in the opinion of the
arbitrability of any claim other than that arising out of the Colorado Securities Act. In short, we do not
read Sandefer as foreclosing consideration by the respondent court of whether the common law claims
should be arbitrated." Id at 549.
67. Id
68. Id at 550.
69. Id (citations omitted).
[Vol. 2008
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In other words, a court retains jurisdiction over claims subject to an arbitration
clause where the factual determinations and legal conclusions are inextricably
intertwined with non-arbitrable claims.70
Post Byrd, the Colorado courts decided several cases providing the courts
with the opportunity to abandon the intertwining doctrine established in Sandefer,
but instead frequently addressed and applied the intertwining doctrine.71 As of
January 2007, "the Intertwining Doctrine, as a Colorado common law doctrine,
and as applied to the [Colorado Unified Arbitration Agreement], is the law in
Colorado ....72
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Ingold v. AIMCO, the Colorado Supreme Court reconsidered its adherence
to the intertwining doctrine.73 The court explained that since the Byrd decision it
had not directly considered its holding in Sandefer; therefore, Colorado courts
continued to follow and expand the intertwining doctrine.74 In deciding whether
to further or reject the intertwining doctrine, the court started with an analysis of
the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act ("CUAA"). 75 In reviewing the plain lan-
guage of the Act, the court explained, "Unless the existence of the arbitration
agreement is disputed, 'the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration
This language leaves no discretion to the trial court whether to compel
arbitration. 76
Similarly, the court found the Byrd reasoning compelling. With respect to the
Federal Arbitration Act, the court summarized, "The intertwining doctrine unrea-
sonably interferes with the parties' decision to arbitrate their disputes, because it
allows the trial court to negate the effect of an arbitration clause without a statuto-
ry basis for doing SO.''77 Arbitration agreements are not mutable and the courts
should not interfere.78
Even though the court found the Byrd reasoning persuasive, it had to over-
come the precedent set forth in Sandefer. The court explained, "Although this
court strongly adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis, we will overrule a prior
holding if we are 'clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no
longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will
come from departing from precedent.' 79 The court was clearly convinced that the
Sandefer holding was incorrect-primarily because the court based its ruling on
70. Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 15.
71. Id. See generally Lawrence St. Partners, Ltd. v. Lawrence St. Venturers, 786 P.2d 508, 511
(Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Grohn v. Sisters of Charity Health Servs. Colo., 960 P.2d 722, 724 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1998); Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789, 797 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001);
Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915, 919 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
72. Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 20.
73. See Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116, 123-25 (Colo. 2007).
74. Id at 124.
75. Id
76. Id. (quoting CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-204(1) (2005)).
77. Id. at 125.
78. Id.
79. Id (quoting People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 788 (Colo. 1999)).
No. 1]
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case law that had since been overturned. 80 The court, therefore, adopted the rea-
soning in Byrd: "[T]he intertwining doctrine, while motivated by reasonable con-
siderations of judicial economy, did not sufficiently take into account the unequi-
vocal language of the Federal Arbitration Act, which is identical to the language
of the CUAA applicable here."
81
Based on the belief that Colorado should not continue to adhere to the intert-
wining doctrine, the court emphatically declared:
We therefore reject the intertwining doctrine and hold that claims that are
subject to an arbitration agreement must be arbitrated regardless of their
joinder with non-arbitrable claims. Claims that are not subject to arbitra-
tion should be stayed or proceed separately in litigation based on the dis-
cretion of the trial court. Sandefer is overruled to the extent that it recog-
nizes the intertwining doctrine.
82
The court mandated that the Ingolds arbitrate their tort and CCPA claims
against Boulder Creek and that the trial court hear the Ingolds' claim against
Boulder Creek for violation of the Security Deposits Act.83 Moreover, any addi-
tional claims against third parties must also be litigated, not arbitrated.84  The
Ingolds must proceed with the arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims separately. 85
V. COMMENT
By forcing the Ingolds into two separate proceedings, the Colorado Supreme
Court surprised the state's legal community in rejecting the intertwining doctrine.
However, it was the court's timing, not its analysis that caused attorneys, judges,
and ADR professionals to take notice. The United States Supreme Court and







86. The following cases provide a sampling of states rejecting the intertwining doctrine. Alabama:
McKee v. Hendrix, 816 So. 2d 30, 34 n.l (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ("Courts must rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate, even if doing so means piecemeal litigation."); Florida: Kinder Mobile Home
Sales, Inc. v. Clemens, 794 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("[Cjontractual duty to arbitrate
cannot be avoided by assertion of claims against additional parties."); Nevada: Benson Pump Co. v. S.
Cent. Pool Supply, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1159-1160 (D. Nev. 2004) (Existence of nonarbitrable
claims did not preclude arbitration.); New Jersey: Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology
Assoc., P.A., 773 A.2d 665, 673 (N.J. 2001) ("The Court concludes that plaintiffs claims should be so
joinded. 'Just as we view piecemeal litigation as anathema, we also look with disfavor upon the unne-
cessary bifurcation of disputes between judicial resolution and arbitration."'); Pennsylvania: In re
Brown, 311 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004) ("[W]here less than all claims are arbitrable... 'the
court may proceed with non-arbitrable claims, but is obliged to honor the arbitration clause agreed to
by the parties and to lay aside arbitrable claims."');Texas: In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 18
S.W.3d 867, 875 (Tex. App. 2000) ("Even when arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are intertwined
and arise out of the same transaction, the arbitrable claims are still subject to arbitration.").
[Vol. 2008
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trine had not existed in the federal system for more than twenty years. 87 Howev-
er, the court continuously decided to do nothing. Until now.
A. Stare Decisis is Not Addressed
The court's opinion is clear, logical, and unequivocal. The intertwining doc-
trine is bad law based on outdated precedent. The court rejected the doctrine be-
cause the "highly persuasive" case law previously relied on had been "repudiated
by the United States Supreme Court.",8F The court does not waiver in declaring
change was a necessity; however, the court failed to address the timing of the
policy shift.
Less than four months before Ingold, Liebman and his fellow practitioners
wrote that the intertwining doctrine "will be before the Colorado Supreme Court
again, and that the [c]ourt either will: (1) reject the Intertwining Doctrine alto-
gether; or (2) re-affirm Colorado's Intertwining Doctrine, but set forth a frame-
work for analysis that requires careful consideration of the interstate com-
merce/FAA issue." 89 Even those practicing within the state were unsure of how
the court would rule and why the court had "chosen not to act" and not align itself
with the majority of the jurisdictions.9"
The Colorado Supreme Court claims it never had the opportunity to directly
reconsider the intertwining doctrine; yet, the issue was frequently before the ap-
pellate courts.9' The court could have sought to review any of the appeals from
those decisions. 92 Further, the court should have been more forthright in its opi-
nion. The court failed to address why the doctrine of stare decisis should not ap-
ply, and in doing so, was intellectually lazy. 93 The court had repeatedly upheld,
by inaction, bad law for twenty years. It remains unclear why the court found it
had to rule against the intertwining doctrine at such a junction. By not addressing
its reasoning, the Court failed to satisfy its standard for overruling precedent. In
2003, the court reiterated that pre-existing rules cannot be abandoned unless the
court is "clearly convinced that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no long-
er sound due to changing conditions and (2) more good than harm will come from
87. See generally Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985).
88. Ingold, 159 P.3d at 125.
89. Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 21.
90. Id. ("It is somewhat unclear why the Intertwining Doctrine retains vitality in Colorado, given
that the Byrd [clourt rejected it based on the stated policies underlying the FAA that are substantially
similar to those underlying the CUAA.").
91. Id. at 15-16.
92. An example of such an instance was Eagle Ridge Condominium Ass'n v. Metropolitan Builders,
Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). The defendants appealed and asked "whether Colorado
should follow the 1985 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Byrd and reject the Intertwining Doc-
trine." Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 20 (citation omitted). Although the court had "the oppor-
tunity to address and clarify some of the complicated questions ... that had plagued Colorado's lower
courts for approximately two decades ... the [court] dismissed its writ as improvidently granted ... 
Id.
93. The court states, "The doctrine of stare decisis is a fundamental component of the rule of law,
as it promotes stability, certainty, and uniformity of judicial decisions." Ingold, 159 P.3d at 125.
Rejecting precedent should not be taken lightly.
No. I1]
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departing from precedent." 94 Although not directly discussed in Ingold, the court
addressed the first point. However, the court failed to address how and why more
good than harm will derive from rejecting the intertwining doctrine.
The court is not required to overrule precedent; in fact, the court favors adher-
ing to the status quo.95 The court could have agreed with the Ingolds and forced
all claims to be litigated. Anyone reading that opinion would have realized that
the court was maintaining the status quo and would have found the holding to be
logically sound. The judiciary is a precedential system which "permits society to
presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivi-
ties of individual[] [judges] .... By ruling based on precedent, the public does
not perceive judicial decisions to be determined by the personal beliefs of the
judges.
Although the court did not follow its own precedent and the tendencies of the
inferior Colorado courts, the Colorado Supreme Court followed the precedent set
forth by the United States Supreme Court.97 The precedent established by the
U.S. Supreme Court was not binding because Byrd involved the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.98 However, the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act is based on, and is
fundamentally the same as, the FAA. 99
Since the two statutes are highly comparable, the court should not be shunned
for overturning its own precedent to align itself with the federal system. Although
not binding, state courts often look to federal courts for guidance. 1°° In this case,
the Colorado court did nothing out of the ordinary to reach its holding. Therefore,
the Ingold ruling does not lead the public into thinking that the judiciary is based
on something other than bedrock principles.
B. Holding Hinders Judicial Efficiency and Economy
The court not only failed to adhere to the bedrock principle of stare decisis, it
also failed to adhere to its own basic principles of self-regulation: party fairness,
efficiency, and judicial economy,' 0 1 The court admitted as much when it stated,
"We agree with the Supreme Court that the intertwining doctrine [is] motivated by
reasonable considerations of judicial economy. .. ."102 By not enforcing the in-
tertwining doctrine, parties must arbitrate arbitrable claims and litigate nonarbitra-
ble claims. In other words, at least two separate proceedings will occur. Both
proceedings could involve the same facts and circumstances. One proceeding
94. Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 239 (Colo. 2003) (citing People v. Blehm,
983 P.2d 779, 788 (Colo. 1999)).
95. In its decisions, the Colorado Supreme Court states that it will apply precedent unless there are
compelling reasons not to apply it. Applying precedent is unequivocally favored. See, e.g., Friedland
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 105 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2005).
96. Ingold, 159 P.3d at 125 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
97. The Colorado Supreme Court uses the language: "We agree with the Supreme Court .. ." Id.
98. As noted above, the Ingolds alleged all state, and no federal, claims.
99. With respect to the specific section under discussion, the language of the FAA "is identical to
the language of the CUAA ...." Id.
100. Id
101. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1174 (N.J. 1989).
102. Ingold, 159 P.3d at 125.
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may even rely on the outcome of the other.'0 3 Two proceedings lead to many
drawbacks, for both the court and arbitration systems.
First, courts must address the issue of whether the nonarbitrable claims
should be stayed pending the arbitration's outcome. The court, in Ingold, pro-
vided some guidance to assist the district courts in determining how to proceed.
The trial court should consider:
(1) whether piecemeal litigation of the nonarbitrable claims could result
in inconsistent determinations of factual and legal issues to be de-
termined by the arbitrator...
(2) whether the piecemeal litigation will be inefficient because the fac-
tual issues to be resolved in litigation overlap with those to be de-
cided by the arbitrator...
(3) whether the arbitrable issues predominate the [Plaintiff's] lawsuit...
and
(4) whether the nonarbitrable claims are of questionable merit. 104
In other words, a court must take into consideration the parties' arguments as
well as explore possible outcomes. To answer each of the above questions, trial
court judges would essentially require parties to brief and possibly argue their case
as though it were a pretrial hearing. After doing so, a court would eventually
oversee the ensuing trial in which it would be obligated to "retry" the case minus
the arbitrable claims.
Second, the parties must prepare for two distinct proceedings. Although liti-
gation is often cited to be the most costly resolution process, arbitration remains
highly costly. 10 5 Depending on the issues, the parties must undergo discovery,
hire arbitrators, and eventually arbitrate the issue. 10 6 Assuming that the trial court
stays the other issues, the parties will be required to repeat the process. This
would involve additional discovery which would lead to more billing hours, more
discovery, and more expenses.
103. It is unclear whether the preclusion doctrines would apply. Preclusion with regard to arbitra-
tion remains murky throughout the nation. However a favored position with regard to preclusion and
the intertwining doctrine is: "In order for collateral estoppel or res judicata to apply ... the parties
must have either adjudicated or have had the opportunity to adjudicate the claim in the previous arbi-
tration. If the claim was excluded, either by the parties themselves or by the state's arbitration act, the
claim could not be adjudicated; therefore, collateral estoppel or res judicata should not apply." Buz-
bee, supra note 27 at 697 (citations omitted). See also PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR.,
6 BRUNER & O'CONNOR CONSTR LAW § 20:58 (2007) ("In the first place, it is far from certain what
collateral estoppel effect an arbitration award might have on a federal proceeding. Neither the full-
faith-and-credit provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738, nor a judicially fashioned rule of preclusion, permits
a federal court to accord res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to an nonappealed arbitration
award.").
104. Ingold, 159 P.3d at 126 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
105. Julia Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How Cultural Values Shape Our Disputing
Processes, 2005 J. DiSP. RESOL. 289, 308 (" In commercial arbitration, for example, as lawyers have
become more involved, arbitration can be just as costly and time-consuming as the trial alternative.
The bigger the case, and the higher the stakes, the more likely it is that arbitration will mirror the
litigation alternative.").
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Third, there is a possibility that the trial court judge and the arbitrator will ar-
rive at different and inconsistent conclusions. If this occurs, both the arbitration
decision and the court decision may stand because "circumstances under which a
court will review and vacate the [arbitration] award are extremely rare."' 10 7 Al-
though the courts have yet to concretely address if, to whom, or how parties may
appeal inconsistent rulings, such result leads to negative, non-judicial ranilfica-
tions. With the arbitrator and the judge arriving at different conclusions based on
the same facts, the legal community and, more importantly, the public will be-
come skeptical at either or both institutions. Since arbitration is relatively new
and less known, the questioning and doubting will fall directly on the shoulders of
the ADR community, 108 not the well-established, way-of-life judiciary.
Fourth, arbitration will become contentious. One of the advantages of arbitra-
tion and ADR as a whole is its ability to remain non-contentious.1°9 The process
is much less a battle to the death than litigation. However, by forcing both the
litigation and arbitration of intertwined issues, trial courts will be forcing parties
to hire attorneys to both litigate and arbitrate the cases. If the arbitration precedes
the litigation, the lawyers will be less willing to assist one another. Discovery will
not be as open and amicable. The proceeding will have more of a trial feel. The
purpose and value of the arbitration will be diminished by the expectancy of liti-
gation.
C. Holding Favors ADR Policy Considerations
With all the judicial drawbacks, the Colorado Supreme Court's rejection of
the intertwining doctrine exemplifies and promotes three advantages to arbitration.
First, removing these claims from the courts diminishes court's congestion. Al-
though one aspect of the case remains on the docket, the court may only have to
address one issue instead of six claims. Not only is arbitration "more efficient,
more private, and less costly than litigation,"110 it also prevents significant backlog
in the courts. 111 The court system, as it is, is overburden and overtaxed. 12 Allow-
107. Karon A. Sasser, Freedom to Contract for Expanded Judicial Review in Arbitration Agree-
ments, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 337, 342 (2001). "Limited judicial review.., is set forth in sections 10 and
11 of the [Federal Arbitration] Act. Section 10 provides the following narrow grounds for vacating an
arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controver-
sy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mu-
tual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
Id. at 341-42 (citations omitted).
108. See generally Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
109. Sasser, supra note 107, at 337 ("Arbitration often reduces hostility between the parties, there-
by increasing the probability of present and future dealings between the parties.").
110. Id.
11. Id. at 365-66.
112. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy And the
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ing the arbitrations to proceed alleviates judges and their staffs from hearing and
deciding claims that should be arbitrated.
Second, Ingold recognizes the importance of contracting and the judiciary's
role in enforcing private contracts." 3 The court found that the intertwining doc-
trine provides parties with a loophole to avoid arbitration. The court explained,
"[T]he intertwining doctrine allows a plaintiff or counter claimant to avoid its
agreement to arbitrate simply by bringing a single non-arbitrable claim."'1 4 The
theory and practice of arbitration relies on a party's ability to contract' 1 5 and the
court's ability to enforce the contract; if that ability is easily negated, parties will
be less willing to enter into arbitration agreements. Similarly, the Colorado Su-
preme Court adhered to its analysis in City and County of Denver v. District
Court.1 16 In that case, the court stated, "Alternative dispute resolution mechan-
isms are favored in Colorado as a convenient, efficient alternative to litigation.
' 17
Moreover the parties have a right to contract for specific ADR procedures. 1 8 The
failure of a court to rule in favor of a "valid ADR clause contravenes Colorado's
public policy of supporting ADR as well as frustrates the intent of the parties who




Third, forcing two separate proceedings may incline parties to reach settle-
ment on either the arbitrable, nonarbitrable, or all claims. Parties will see the
potential time and monetary commitments and determine settlement to be a better
option. 20 If the case only proceeded to arbitration, one party may be less willing
Most observers agree that there is too much litigation. Backlogs are epidemic, and we have seen
the rise of bureaucratic justice to help handle the deluge. Despite the unprecedented recent in-
crease in the number of federal judgeships, judges represent barely five percent of the federal ju-
diciary's payroll. They are supported by an increasingly large phalanx of assistants-magistrates,
law clerks, law student 'interns'-to whom they are forced to delegate greater responsibilities.
Still, even with all this help, the federal courts seem in danger of losing control of their dockets.
Id.
113. Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116, 124-25 (Colo. 2007) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
The right of the parties to contract freely is well developed in our jurisprudence. This right en-
compasses the correlative power to agree to a specific ADR procedure for resolving disputes.
Since parties, by agreement, may substitute a different method for adjudication of their disputes
than those which would otherwise be available to them in public courts of law, the CUAA is
written to interfere as little as possible with the freedom of consenting parties to achieve that ob-
jective.
Id.
114. Id. at 125.
115. Sasser, supra note 107, at 337-38.
The courts have regarded arbitration as a creature of contract. An arbitration agreement is a vo-
luntary decision, and parties will not be required to arbitrate if they have not explicitly contracted
to arbitrate. Parties who choose to include arbitration clauses in their contract may also contract
for the details of the arbitration proceeding. The parties may include provisions in the contract
stating exactly what issues the arbitrator may hear and decide, the types of damages the arbitrator
may award, and the rules under which the arbitrator will operate.
Id. (citations omitted).
116. City & County of Denver v. Dist. Ct., 939 P.2d 1353 (Colo. 1997).
117. Id. at 1357.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Recently, scholars have analyzed the ethical concerns of a judge's role in settlement. The
main issue is whether judges can and should force parties into settlement discussions prior to litigation.
The dismissal of the intertwining doctrine does not force settlement, it only indirectly promotes it.
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to settle because it may believe that it has the superior case. However, with two
proceedings, regardless of the strength of the case, the parties will be burdened
with extra obligations. Moreover with the potential for two conflicting decisions,
settlement would avoid the confusion that may arise when a judge orders one
action and the arbitrator orders another.
Prior to Ingold, Leibman wrote:
Although the state of the Intertwining Doctrine in Colorado may seem
uncertain at first glance, the practitioner can glean enough from the ap-
plicable cases to properly analyze, brief, and argue a case that presents
arbitrability and intertwining issues. The careful practitioner should be
aware of the state of flux in this area of law, along with the concomitant
opportunities and pitfalls. Finally, given the potential for a change in this
area of law, attorneys should carefully preserve all applicable issues for
appeal.1
21
Now, the law is clear, and attorneys know how to proceed. Arbitrable claims
are to be arbitrated and nonarbitrable claims are to be litigated. With respect to
any legal implications, Ingold simply changes the law. Prior case law is no longer
valid, and any future cases will rely on Ingold as the standard. Practitioners famil-
iar with the federal courts will not even miss a step in the Colorado state courts.
Those lawyers that continue to plead nonarbitrable claims in the state courts will
see those claims dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The law is
clear, and judges will no longer try nonarbitrable claims under the intertwining
doctrine. Greater legal ramifications existed under the old law due to uncertainty
and lack of clarity. As Leibman implied, the intertwining doctrine was primed to
be tossed aside; it was only a matter of when.1 22 Therefore, parties involved in
such cases had additional maneuvering and positioning unsure how the court
would decide.
123
With respect to policy considerations, Colorado now adamantly adheres to
promoting ADR and private contracting. Unfortunately it is unclear whether this
is desirable public policy. Both the federal and state courts are struggling with
joinder and the desire to package claims and parties into one trial. 124 Combining
related litigations into one case instead of litigating independently "eliminates
duplicative litigation, and thus generally is more efficient than repetitive litigation
from a societal standpoint; scarce judicial resources need to be expended only
once to unravel the facts of a dispute."' 125 It appears that undoing the intertwining
doctrine is no different than unpackaging.1 26 Exactly how this will affect Colora-
do is yet to be seen. As to the federal courts, it is unclear whether Byrd has had
Therefore, this casenote does not discuss this issue. However, a full analysis may be found in the
following article: Sylvia Shaz Shweder, Judicial Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges
Encouraging Settlements, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL EThics 51 (2007).
121. Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33, at 21.
122. See generally Liebman & Riggs, supra note 33.
123. Id.
124. Freer, supra note 112, at 813.
125. Id
126. The more proper term would be "not packaging," which means not joining parties or claims
with intertwined causes of actions.
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any drastic affects besides promoting arbitration and enforcing private contracts.
Nevertheless, a concern remains that duplicative resolutions could have significant
effects on parties as well as the public's view of the legal community.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Ingold v. AIMCO, the Colorado Supreme Court aligned itself with the fed-
eral judiciary and rejected the intertwining doctrine. In doing so, the court fa-
vored private ADR contracting and failed to uphold the basic tenants of the judi-
ciary.127 With the advent of docket backlog and the growth of arbitration, the
Colorado court and courts across the country continue to advocate alternative
methods of resolving disputes. Litigation is not always the best way to solve con-
troversies, and if parties have contracted to avoid it, the court should-and must-
enforce their agreement. No matter how complicated the case or how many caus-
es of action, claims that fall within the scope of the arbitration clause will be arbi-
trated.
MICHAEL BEKESHA
127. Although "having a court and arbitrators resolve the same factual issues is not a particularly
efficient allocation of resources, may be somewhat impractical, and theoretically could lead to incon-
sistent result," the courts maintain that "[a]ny inefficiency or risk of inconsistent results is a conse-
quence of the parties' bargaining" and that, in light of arbitration statutes, the courts "are required to
enforce those bargains despite their potential shortcomings." Hallmark Indus., L.L.C. v. First Systech
Int'l, Inc., 52 P.3d 812, 815 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
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